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Abstract—Peer-to-Peer networks are designed to rely on re-
sources of their own users. Therefore, resource management
plays an important role in P2P protocols. Therefore, resource
management plays an important role in P2P protocols. Early P2P
networks did not use proper mechanisms to manage fairness.
However, after seeing difficulties and rise of freeloaders in
networks like Gnutella, the importance of providing fairness
for users have become apparent. In this paper, we propose an
incentive based security model which leads to a network infras-
tructure that lightens the work of Seeders and makes Leechers
to contribute more. This method is able to prevent betrayals
in Leecher-to-Leecher transactions and more importantly, helps
Seeders to be treated more fairly. This is what other incentive
methods such as Bittorrent are incapable of doing. Additionally,
by getting help from cryptography and combining it with our
method, it is also possible to achieve secure channels, immune
to spying, next to a fair network. The simulation results clearly
show that how our proposed approach can overcome free-riding
issue. In addition, our findings revealed that our approach is able
to provide an appropriate level of fairness for the users and can
decrease the download time.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network is a distributed solution
which uses the resources of its own users. In these net-
works, each node uses the resources of other users and also
has the capability to provide resources for other nodes [1],
[2]. These networks have many applications, including file
sharing, distributed processing and messages passing to other
nodes which can cause many security problems [3], [4]. P2P
networks are highly dependent on resources of their own
users [5]. Therefore, the infrastructure of a P2P network
should encourage users for contributions as well as using the
resources of other members. The behavior of using resources
of others without giving anything in return is called free-riding
[6]. As a consequence, free-riders cause slower download
times for contributing peers. Thus, it is an essential need
for a P2P network to guarantee fair bandwidth allocation,
where a peer receives bandwidth equal to what it contributes.
Accordingly, the system will be able to guarantee a certain
level of performance for contributing peers.
Fair bandwidth allocation in P2P networks is not an easy
task that can be tackled simply. This is due to the nature
of P2P networks in which there is no central entity that can
control and arbitrate access to all resources, and to schedule
fair allocation of bandwidth for a router. Moreover, in P2P
networks there is no perception in advance regarding the
amount of bandwidth resources available and peers cannot
be relied upon to specify their own resources honestly [7].
Although free-riding can be a deliberate act, many users may
become freeloaders or infringe fairness for lack of a proper
infrastructure [8].
Since Seeders 1 are in the network only for altruistic
reasons, a fair network should be designed in a way to put
most of the traffics on the shoulder of Leechers. In this way,
instead of getting free downloads, more users are encouraged
to contribute to the network. Also, by mitigating the work of
Seeders, we encourage them to stay longer in the network. For
this purpose, we propose an incentive method which provides
a proper infrastructure for fairness in P2P networks. This
enables us to protect both Leecher-to-Leecher and Leecher-
to-Seeder transactions. In other words, we do not only focus
on protecting Leechers against freeloaders, but our goal is
to protect Seeders as well. Furthermore, we show that by
getting help and combining the standard methodology in
cryptography, i.e. RSA, we can secure our channels against
line spying, next to providing a fair network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
II we review the existing work for providing fairness in
P2P networks. Section III introduces our proposed approach
and its respective components as an incentive approach to
provide fairness in P2P networks. In section IV we elaborate
our proposed approach by improving it with proper use of
cryptography. In this section, we show how it is possible to
protect communication channels as well. In section V we
analyze the functionality of our proposed method through
simulations. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Incentive-based systems usually consider some form of
reward to encourage users for more cooperation. BitTorrent
1For simplicity, we call nodes with all packets, Seeder and nodes without
all packets, Leecher. These terminologies are taken from BitTorrent protocol.
is one of the first major attempts which used incentive in
its protocol [9]. It proposed a tit-for-tat (TFT) mechanism in
order to incentivize peers to contribute resources to the system
and discourage free-riders. As an important benefit, TFT
encourages peers for more contribution without the need for
centralized infrastructures. However, one important challenge
regarding BitTorrent is that the robustness of the system is
questionable. This is due to the fact that many of the contribu-
tions for improving the performance are unnecessary and can
be reallocated or refused while still improving performance
for strategic users. As a result, there are always some peers
who contribute more data to the system than others.
It was shown that a cetralized authority can improve the
fairness in BitTorrent [10]. In [11] and [12], the authors used
BitTorrent infrastructure to build their own fairness models.
The main idea is to incentivize seeder stay longer in the Bit-
Torrent network. The authors argued that download bandwidth
of a leecher is the sum of all its associated peers’ upload
bandwidth, so redistribution of its associated peers’ upload
bandwidth could manage the leecher’s download bandwidth.
Although these approaches can help those peers who stay
longer in the network get better download speed, in some cases
they increase the overall download completion time.
Next to BitTorrent and its derivatives, there are other
incentive methods which take an independent approach such
as [13]–[15]. In [13], the authors mainly focused on locating
free-riders and taking actions against them. They proposed a
framework in which each peer monitors its neighbors, decides
if they are free-riders, and takes appropriate actions. Moreover,
their approach does not require any permanent identification
of peers or security infrastructures for maintaining a global
reputation system. The results revealed that their proposed
framework is able to reduce the effects of free- riding and
can, therefore, increase the performance of a P2P network.
Although this is an interesting approach, it suffers from a
low number of downloads by contributors which arise from
false detection in determining free-riders. This will ultimately
influence the performance.
In [14], the authors have proposed a Gnutella-like unstruc-
tured P2P file sharing network that utilizes free-riders to index
files. This method is aimed to assist route query messages to
destination peers. The authors suggested modifying a peer’s
neighbor table construction so that a free-rider has a lot of non-
freeloaders as its overlay neighbors, while a non-freeloader’s
neighbors are mostly free-riders. Moreover, each peer also
keeps information about its neighbors’ files so that when
a peer receives a query, it can determine if its neighbor
has the queried file, or needs to forward query messages to
continue the search. The findings obtained from this approach
showed that the proposed method is able to improve search
efficiency. However, one important security threat regarding
this approach is that the authors assumed that peers faithfully
execute the client program so that they follow the protocol
designed by the program to build their neighbor tables and
to relay query messages. If an adversary hacks the program,
then it will be able to change the protocol. In [15], the
authors suggested the use if a new P2P file sharing scheme
based on the repeated Public Good (PG) game model. They
mostly focused on trust evaluation, repeated interactions, and
iterative self-learning techniques. The idea is to induce all
peers to share files as many as possible by incorporating a
trust-based P2P mechanism. The simulation results showed
that the proposed scheme is able to maintain system efficiency
as high as possible respond to current network conditions for
adaptive management.
Trust management systems are methods to establish word-
of-mouth for P2P networks. This means that based on transac-
tions between nodes, they evaluate a degree of trust for each
node which is mostly used for establishing a fair network.
Finding a malicious user from its neighbors is a selection
problem. Methods such as fuzzy decision making [17], [18]
and genetic-based algorithms [19] can be used to select the
free-riders from multiple criteria. A successful trust manage-
ment system that uses this approach is [20]. The [16], [21] are
other examples of trust management systems. EigenTrust is the
name of an approach proposed In [16]. This method uses an
algorithm to decrease the number of downloads of inauthentic
files in a P2P network that assigns each peer a unique global
trust value, based on the peer’s history of uploads. For this
purpose, the authors proposed a distributed and secure method
to compute global trust values, based on power iteration. These
values are then used by peers to select the peers from whom
they download.
As a result, the network will be able to identify malicious
peers and isolates them from the network. EigenTrust is able
to decrease the number of inauthentic files on the network,
even under a variety of conditions where malicious peers
cooperate in an attempt to subvert the system. In [21], the
authors have introduced an approach to predict a peer’s co-
operation level, focusing on the cooperation induced by the
P2P protocol rather than the cooperation that results from
user behavior or bandwidth limitation. This method mainly
focuses on live streaming applications. By investigating the
correlation between a peer’s cooperation level, the authors
tried to show that three centrality metrics, namely out-degree,
out-closeness, and betweenness, are positively correlated with
the cooperation level. Based on this, they proposed a non-
linear regression model to measure peer’s out-degree in the
recent past to predict its cooperation level value in the near
future.
III. THE PROPOSED METHOD
In this section, we propose an incentive model which
can be used in versatile infrastructures. In our presented
model, we increase fairness for both Leechers and Seeders.
At first, we define how two Leechers should exchange packets
and further demonstrate the mechanism for Leecher-to-Seeder
transactions.
A. Protecting Leecher-to-Leecher Transactions
In this procedure, we aim to force Leechers to upload as
much as they download from others. To this end, we consider
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Fig. 1. The process of data exchange between two Leechers.
K ′ and K ′′ as two separate keys which are required by all
nodes in the network. We define E(X), for encryption and
D(X) for decryption of data X . Each node in the network
is represented as ni, i = 0, 1, . . . , k. If ni wants to encrypt
data X , it should use K ′ni . Therefore, we define function
crypt(E(X),K ′
ni
) for encryption of dataX with keyK ′
ni
. On
the other hand, for ni to decrypt data X , it is always required
to use K ′′
ni
, we have crypt(D(X),K ′′
ni
) for decryption of data
X with key K ′′
ni
.
Suppose n1 and n2 are two Leechers which want to ex-
change data X1 and X2. In the first step, n2 sends the query
package Q1 = (REQ,X1, n1) at which it requests data X1
from n1. After receiving Q1, n1 sends Q2 = (REQ,X2, n2)
for n2 to ask for data X2. Before sending X1, n1 encrypts X1
with K ′
n1
. Accordingly, before sending X2, n2 encrypts X2
with K ′
n2
.


n2 → n1 : Q1 = (REQ,X1, n1)
n1 → n2 : Q2 = (REQ,X2, n2)
n1 → n1 : crypt(E(X1),K
′
n1
)
n2 → n2 : crypt(E(X2),K
′
n2
)
(1)
When the encryption process completes, package Q3 =
(X1,K
′
n1
, n2) will be sent to n2. The decryption procedure
for getting X1 requires K
′′
n1
, so n2 must continue the trans-
action. After receiving Q3 and performing the encryption
process, n2 will send the package Q4 = (X2,K
′
n2
, n1) to
n1. To complete this procedure, nodes n1 and n2 need K
′′
n1
and K ′′n2 respectively to decrypt their downloaded data. The
process of exchanging the keys is done by n1 which sends
the package Q5 = (EXC,K
′′
n1
, n2) to n2. Doing this, it
forwards K ′′n1 to n2. Accordingly, receiving Q5, n2 sends
Q6 = (EXC,K
′′
n2
, n1) to n1. As a result, n1 gets K
′′
n1
.


n1 → n2 : Q3 = (X1,K
′
n1
, n2)
n2 → n1 : Q4 = (X2,K
′
n2
, n1)
n1 → n2 : Q5 = (EXC,K
′′
n1
, n2)
n2 → n1 : Q6 = (EXC,K
′′
n2
, n1)
(2)
At this stage, both nodes receive their requested data and
have the keys for decryption. Using K ′′n2 and K
′′
n1
, nodes n1
and n2 extract X2 and X1 respectively.
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Fig. 2. The process of data exchange between two Leechers and a Seeder.
{
n1 → n1 : crypt(D(X2),K
′′
n2
)
n2 → n2 : crypt(D(X1),K
′′
n1
)
(3)
It is important to be pointed out that, afte receiving Q5,
n2 can leave the process without sharing K
′′
n2
with n1.
Since we forced him to upload, economically we take away
the incentives for betrayal. In real world applications, such
behavior can even become disadvantageous. As nodes can
mark them and refuse the future transactions. In Fig. 1, a better
view of this process is demonstrated.
B. Protecting Leecher-to-Seeder Transactions
To protect Seeders, we need to reduce their workloads
by relegating the traffics to Leechers. In this way, we force
Leechers to take responsibility for their downloads and engage
them to upload process. As a result, Seeders by reducing
their work are encouraged to stay longer in the network. This
concept is first introduced in [22] with a P2P management
system. In this work, we show that it is still possible to protect
Seeders in an incentive model.
Suppose that n1 and n2 are in contact with s, as the
Seeder. Suppose n1 sends Q1 = (REQ,X1&X2, s) to ask
for X1 and X2 from s. In the same way, n2 sends Q2 =
(REQ,X1&X2, s) for asking the same data from s. After
Seeder s receives Q1, it encryptX1 with K
′
s
. In the same way,
after receiving Q2, it encrypst X2 with K
′
s. After encryption,
s sends Q3 = (X1,K
′
s, n1) to send the encrypted data X1 for
n1 and Q4 = (X2,K
′
s
, n2) to send the encrypted data X2 for
n2. 

n1 → s : Q1 = (REQ,X1&X2, s)
n2 → s : Q2 = (REQ,X1&X2, s)
s → s : crypt(E(X1),K
′
s
)
s → s : crypt(E(X2),K
′
s)
s → n1 : Q3 = (X1,K
′
s
, n1)
s → n2 : Q4 = (X2,K
′
s
, n2)
(4)
For decryption process , both n1 and n2 need to obtain
K ′′
s
. In order to do this, s can force them to cooperate and
upload for each other. Therefore, to obtain K ′′s , n1 sends
Q5 = (X1,K
′
s
, n2) to upload X1 for n2. Accordingly, n2
sends Q6 = (X2,K
′
s, n1) to upload X2 for n1. In this stage,
both n1 and n2 shared their resources. For n1 to obtain K
′′
s ,
n2 sends Q7 = (ACK,X1, s) to indicate X1 is received and
s is allowed to share K ′′s with n1. Node s after receiving Q7,
sends Q8 = (EXC,K
′′
s
, n1) to the key K
′′
s
for n1.

n1 → n2 : Q5 = (X1,K
′
s, n2)
n2 → n1 : Q6 = (X2,K
′
s
, n1)
n2 → s : Q7 = (ACK,X1, s)
s → n1 : Q8 = (EXC,K
′′
s
, n1)
n1 → s : Q9 = (ACK,X2, s)
s → n2 : Q10 = (EXC,K
′′
s , n2)
(5)
For n2 to receive the key, n1 should apply for the same
process. This means that after receiving Q8, n1 sends Q9 =
(ACK,X2, s) to indicate it has received X2 from n2. After
receiving Q9, node s sends Q10 = (EXC,K
′′
s , n2) in order to
forward K ′′
s
to n2. In the last step, n1 and n2 which acquired
X1, X2 and their keys, decrypt X1 and X2.

n1 → n1 : crypt(D(X1),K
′′
s
)
n1 → n1 : crypt(D(X2),K
′′
s )
n2 → n2 : crypt(D(X1),K
′′
s
)
n2 → n2 : crypt(D(X2),K
′′
s
)
(6)
This protocol follows the procedure shown in equaton 9 and
the whole process is illustrated in Fig. 2.
IV. IMPROVING THE BASIC DESIGN
We can use the common protocols in cryptography to further
improve our basic model in the previous section. In practice,
by using symmetric key encryption, only one key is required
for doing both process of encryption and decryption. As a
result, we do not need to have two separate keys for each
node. Also, we can further improve this method and protect
communications against line spying. To this end, we use RSA
algorithm [23] which requires two new keys for each node.
Suppose Alice (A) and Bob (B) want to exchange data Xa,
Xb. First, B sends the query package Q1 = (REQ,Xa, A)
to request Xa from A. After receiving Q1, A generates three
different keys, Kasy , Kapu and Kapr .
Alice { Ka sy , Kbpu , K apr }
Kasy
pu
(1) Request
(2) Upload packet A 
Kbsy(3) Upload packet B 
pu
Bob { Ka sy , Kbpu , K apr  }
Ka   _Kbsy (4) Send   
(5) Send   Kb   _Kasy 
Fig. 3. The process of data exchange, using cryptography methods.
The key Kasy is the symmetric key which can be used to
encrypt and decrypt data X . Keys Kapu and Kapr are used
as a public and private key respectively. They are essential
parameters in the RSA algorithm. After generating the keys,
A sends query package Q2 = (EXC,Kapu , B) to exchange
its public key with B. After B receives the package Q2, it
follows the same pattern by generating Kbsy as its symmetric
key, Kbpu as the public key and Kbpr as private key of
RSA algorithm. As like as the previous procedure, Kbsy is
for encrypting and decrypting data X . After the keys are
generated,, B sends Q3 = (EXC,Kbpu , A) to complete the
public key exchange with A.


B → A : Q1 = (REQ,Xa, A)
A → B : Q2 = (EXC,Kapu , B)
B → A : Q3 = (EXC,Kbpu , A)
(7)
Once the process of exchanging Kapu and Kbpu finishes,
A encrypts data Xa with Kasy . When encryption process
completes, A sends the query package Q4 = (Xa,K
′
asy
, B) to
B and forward the encrypted dataXa to it. After receivingQ4,
B encrypts dataXb withKbsy . Once this process completes,B
sends Q5 = (Xb,Kbsy , A) to A in order to deliver encrypted
data Xb to it.


A → A : crypt(E(Xa),Kasy)
A → B : Q4 = (Xa,K
′
asy
, B)
B → B : crypt(E(Xb),Kbsy)
B → A : Q5 = (Xb,Kbsy , A)
(8)
In this stage, both nodes received their data. To exchange
Kasy and Kbsy , we use RSA methodology to be able
to protect them from line spying. To exchange Kasy and
Kbsy , at first A uses crypt(E(Kasy ),Kbpu) to encrypt Kasy
with Kbpu and uses Q6 = (Kasy ,Kbpu , B) to send the
encrypted key Kasy for B. After receiving Q6, B uses
crypt(D(Kasy ),Kbpr ) to open the Kasy first, and then uses
crypt(D(Xa),Kasy) to receive data Xa. To complete the
transaction, B sends Q7 = (Kbsy ,Kapu, A) to send the
encrypted key Kbsy for A. As the last step, A at first
uses crypt(D(Kbsy ),Kapr) to open the Kbsy , and then uses
crypt(D(Xb),Kbsy ) to receive data Xb.


A → A : crypt(E(Kasy ),Kbpu)
A → B : Q6 = (Kasy ,Kbpu , B)
B → B : crypt(D(Kasy ),Kbpr)
B → B : crypt(D(Xa),Kasy)
B → A : Q7 = (Kbsy ,Kapu , A)
A → A : crypt(D(Kbsy ),Kapr )
A → A : crypt(D(Xb),Kbsy )
(9)
The above protocol is shown in Fig. 3. All data exchanges
for both Leecher-to-Leecher and Leecher-to-Seeder, described
in previous section should adapt and follow these steps. In this
way, next to providing fairness for the network we can shield
the communication channels as well.
V. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness and function-
ality of our proposed approach through simulation. For this
purpose, we use a network similar to Bitorrent protocol. In
this environment, we initially compare our method with a
network which only relies on willingness on the users. In order
to appropriately examine the effectiveness of our approach,
we mainly focus on the evaluation propagation, fairness for
Seeders, fairness for all nodes (Seeders and Leechers) and
free-riding prevention. In the next step (see Section V-D), by
introducing tit-for-tat for nodes, we compare our method with
Bittorrent.
A. Propagation of Packets
Initially, we examine the packet propagation among nodes
in the overlay. For this purpose, at each time interval, we
calculated the average of all packets in the network. This
shows how much time does it take for the nodes to complete
their downloads tasks.
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Fig. 4. Simulation results show that using our method is beneficial for data
propagation in the network.
For this experiment, we used a static network of 1000 nodes
and initialised it with 10 Seeders. The data were divided into
100 smaller packets. Simulation stopped when all nodes in
the network completed their downloads. The result is shown
in Fig. 4. As it can be seen, we compared our method with
the willingness of users. By forcing users to upload more, they
used the extra resources and could complete their downloads
sooner. The results clearly shows that our approach enables
nodes to download more packets in a certain time period
compared to other willingness categories.
B. Fairness for Users
To measure fairness for Seeders, the most important factor
is their number of uploads. Therefore, we examine the mean
of all uploaded packets for them at each time interval. For this
experiment, a dynamic network of 1000 nodes is used. In this
scenario, we assumed that Leechers would simply leave the
network after completing their downloads. We used 10 Seeders
and distributed them in the network evenly. Moreover, the data
were divided into 100 smaller packets. Simulation was stopped
when all nodes finished their downloads and left the network.
The result of this experiment can be seen in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 5. Results of fairness Examination for Seeders.
Even though our method showed better performance com-
pared to its rivals (except in one case), but the difference is not
significant. This is mainly because we used only 10 Seeders
against 990 Leechers. As a result, most of the transactions
were between Leechers. It is expected when Seeders have
more opportunities to relegate their uploads, the result will be
more transparent. We further examine this situation in Section
V-D when we put our method against Bittorrent.
The overall average of uploads is useful to see how traffic
is relegated from Seeders. But using overall uploads does not
reveal fairness. To better understand the situation consider two
pairs of nodes. One pair with (90, 10) uploads and the other
pair with (50, 50) uploads. Even though both of them have the
same mean, in the first pair, fairness is not served. Therefore,
we have to use the variance of uploads. Variance shows to
which extent nodes deviated their uploads from the mean of
all uploads.
For this experiment we used a network of 100 nodes and
10 Seeders with 100 packets. We made sure that network
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Fig. 6. Results of fairness examination for all nodes.
is completely static so we could examine the behaviors of
every node in the network. Simulation was running until all
Leechers finished their downloads. As we can see in Fig. 6,
when less users are willing to share, most probably other
users (mostly Seeders) get abused. This shows that when
network does not implement a proper fairness mechanism,
altruistic users are most vulnerable entities which suffer from
such infrastructure. The result shows that as much as the
willingness level decreases, the variance increases which is an
indicator about the deviation from the mean of all uploads. In
this experiment, our approach showed the minimum variance
among other examined methods.
C. Freer-riding Prevention
Another important issue that we examine is free-riding
prevention. The only way that freeloaders can live in a network
shielded with our method is 1- using optimistic-unchock2 and
2- using Seeders when they do not have anyone to force them
for contribution. Since the amount of downloads they can get
from this way is significantly smaller, freeloaders have a hard
time to finish their downloads.
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Fig. 7. The efficiency of our approach for keeping freeloaders for a much
more longer time in the network.
For this experiment, we implemented a network with 500
nodes and 100 packets. We had 10 Seeders and 5 freeloaders
which were distributed evenly in the network. Simulation was
stopped when all freeloaders finished their downloads. We
put our method against a 50% willingness network. As it
can be seen in Fig. 7 with our method, freeloaders have
to stay much longer in the network. Clearly, almost in all
scenarios, in the network which benefits from our approach,
the freeloaders have to stay three times longer than a 50%
willingness network.
D. A Comparison with Bittorrent
In a Leecher-to-Leecher transaction, unlike Bittorrent, we
prevent betrayals before they take place. Another main ad-
2In optimistic-unchoke, Leechers always uploads for a random node without
considering if it is uploading back. In this way, new nodes also get a chance to
acquire some packet. This helps newcomers to engage in future transactions
[?].
vantage of our method comes from Leecher-to-Seeder trans-
actions. The reason is that Bittorrent did not implement any
mechanisms to help Seeders in the network. Therefore, we
examine two main factors: 1- how much Leechers are forced
to upload more and 2- how much Seeders upload less.
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Fig. 8. The capability of our approach to encourage Leechers to upload more.
Since Seeders play a crucial role in this experiment, we
chose a smaller network with 30 nodes and 6 Seeders which
were distributed evenly in the network. We used 100 packets
in the network. In the first experiment (Fig. 8), we show how
much our method makes Leechers to take responsibility for
their downloads. Simulation stopped when all of Leechers
finished their downloads. After finishing downloads they could
leave the network or stay and become another Seeder. For this
purpose, 10 Leechers were chosen randomly for our analysis.
The result is shown in Fig. 8. As we can see, in most cases,
by using our method, Leechers uploaded more. In addition,
compared to Bittorent, the reliance on Seeders is lower.
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Fig. 9. With the proposed method Seeders tend to upload less.
In the second experiment (Fig. 9), we aimed to analyse the
number of uploads for Seeders. As we already mentioned, we
had six Seeders in the network which were distributed evenly
in the overlay. The average of uploads for all six Seeders at
each time interval is shown in Fig. 9. As it can be seen, as
the time increases, the average of uploads of Seeders increases
as well. However, in a network which uses our approach, this
increment is slightly lower than Bittorent. This confirms the
functionality of our approach against Bittorent. At the end
of the simulation time, this difference in the average number
of uploads, reaches its maximum limit. This reveals how our
approach performs better as the time increases.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Fairness is one of the most important challenges in P2P
communications. In this paper, we proposed an incentive-
based and fully distributed model that is aimed to accurately
provide fairness in P2P networks. Our approach supports both
Leechers and Seeders against freeloaders. The former is met
by making Leechers upload as much as they download from
others. The latter is guaranteed by reducing the workload of
Seeders by relegating the traffics to Leechers. Consequently,
we force Leechers to take responsibility for their downloads
and engage in the uploading process. As a result, they are
encouraged to stay longer in the network. We further showed
that by combining the standard methodology in cryptography,
i.e. RSA, we can secure our channels against line spying
next to providing a fair network. Our findings obtained from
the simulation results clearly shows the effectiveness and
applicability of our approach by decreasing the download time,
providing an appropriate level of fairness among peers, and
preventing free-riding.
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